Kaspa network prepares for the arrival of the quantum threat

The threat of quantum computing over cryptocurrencies seems to be still far off, but networks like Kaspa are already starting to design defenses. Developer Gaurav Rana developed a proposal to improve Kaspa (KIP) that seeks to prepare the network for “resisting attacks based on the Shor” algorithm, considered one of the main quantum instruments that could violate current digital signature systems.

The document, published last May and still under discussion, proposes an update in the wallet layer, introducing addresses called P2PKH-Blake2b-256-via-P2SH.

These acronyms mean that the network would use an address of the type to pay for a public key hash (P2PKH), using the 256-bit Blake2b cryptographic function and encapsulated in a type of address – stick to a hash of script (P2SH).

As explained in the repository, these directions allow hiding the public keys after a cryptographic commitment until the time of expenditure, mitigating the risk that quantum adversaries will extract private keys from exposed public keys.

The central motivation of KIP is based on a concern: the quantum computers running the Shor algorithm would be able to solve the problem of the discrete logarithm in elliptic curves (ECDLP).

This would break the security of Schnorr firms, which currently protect transactions in Kaspa, as detailed by the developer.

The current management format, known as P2PK (paying to a public key), exposes the public keys when making a transaction.

The initiative points out that, under a quantum scenario, this represents a high risk. In contrast, the proposed addresses (P2PKH-Blake2b-via-P2SH) differ in the exposure of the public key to the time of expenditure, using a cryptographic hash as a protective measure.

It is about ensuring that the public key is not revealed until it is spent – and that, thanks to the hash function Blake2b-226, the addresses have been protected since its creation.

Armor without consensus changes

The KIP emphasizes that this change does not require modifying the consensus (PoW) of the network: all the node software remains intact, the document reads. In addition, the mining and validation infrastructure continues to use existing P2SH management.

This means that the transition could be executed without hard forks or alterations in the protocol, voluntarily by users, wallets, and exchanges.

Implementation strategy

The plan is divided into three phases. The first introduces the new addresses in the wallet layer, where these would be generated by default, also showing messages explaining quantum protection in user interfaces.

The second stage seeks integration with exchanges and custodians, which should include shipping and spending support from the new directions.

Finally, the third phase proposes the gradual deactivation of P2PK addresses, accompanied by warnings for users who continue to use them. The suggested time horizon for completing this initial migration is 1 to 3 months.

The economic impact of the measure is considered minimal. The paper notes that the overload of size in scripts is marginal and that long-term protection benefits far outweigh the costs.

Short and long-term benefits for Kaspa

The proposal concludes that the immediate benefits include the “mitigation of quantum attacks to new directions” and a reinforcement of users’ confidence by perceiving a proactive security posture.

In the long term, the transition would strengthen the maturity of Kaspa’s ecosystem and position it as a competitive network against chains that have not taken precautions against quantum risk.